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Program Knowledge and Savings Outcomes in a  
Child Development Account Experiment 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether participants’ program knowledge is associated with savings outcomes in Child 
Development Accounts and whether differences in program knowledge explain racial and ethnic disparities in savings 
outcomes. Analyses of data collected from treatment participants in the SEED for Oklahoma Kids (SEED OK) 
experiment (N = 1,139) indicate that knowledge of SEED OK program features is low: on average, participants are 
aware of 1.24 of three features, and averages are lower among Blacks and Hispanics. Logit and Tobit regressions 
show that program knowledge is positively related to likelihood of holding a SEED OK participant-owned account 
and to individual savings amounts. Program knowledge is estimated to contribute to racial disparities in savings 
outcomes: if Whites and minorities had the same levels of program knowledge, gaps in savings outcomes would 
significantly decline. These findings challenge the assumption, based in neoclassical economics, that individuals 
participate in savings programs if benefits from incentives outweigh costs of participation. Findings call for the 
development of policy designs and communication tools to enhance knowledge of program features among participants, 
especially members of racial and ethnic minorities. 
Keywords: Child Development Accounts, survey, evaluation, racial and ethnic differences, knowledge level, 
incentives 
In recent decades, interest in college savings has dramatically increased among policymakers and the 
general public in the United States. Widening earnings gaps between college-educated adults and 
high school graduates show that college education plays a critical role in individuals’ success in the 
current economy (Baum, Ma, & Payea, 2010; Danziger & Gottschalk, 1995), yet the cost of college 
has skyrocketed, rising twice as fast as the general inflation rate (FinAid, 2014). Education ranks 
third, following retirement and emergencies, in most frequently mentioned motivations for saving 
(Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, & Moore, 2009). 
In this context, federal and state governments have implemented various savings programs to 
improve children’s futures. Important examples of these efforts can be found in 529 college savings 
plans and the associated tax benefits (Clancy, Cramer, & Parrish, 2005). In addition, new initiatives 
are testing progressive and universal Child Development Accounts (CDAs), which are savings or 
investment accounts opened for lifelong development and, often, for postsecondary education. 
Proponents of CDAs suggest that savings programs for children’s future may improve families’ 
efforts to save for specific purposes and generate positive outcomes for the families as well as 
children. For example, such programs may improve financial management skills, hope for children’s 
future, and children’s developmental outcomes (Beverly, Elliott, & Sherraden, 2013; Huang, 
Sherraden, Kim, & Clancy, 2014; Nam, Kim, Clancy, Zager, & Sherraden, 2013). 
Over the same period, policymakers and social researchers in the United States have observed 
widening racial and ethnic disparities in wealth, recognizing the impacts of those disparities on 
children’s educational attainment. The median wealth gap between Whites and Blacks, measured as 
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the ratio of median wealth held by Whites to that held by Blacks, increased between 1995 (7:1) and 
2009 (19:1). The gap between Whites and Hispanics rose over the same period: 7:1 in 1995 and 15:1 
in 2009 (Taylor, Kochhar, Fry, Velasco, & Motel, 2011). In estimates from analyses that control for 
many other factors, parents’ wealth is consistently associated with children’s formal educational 
attainment (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009; Zhan & Sherraden, 2003). Accordingly, reducing 
racial and ethnic disparities in wealth and savings may be a way to decrease education gaps between 
Whites and minority groups. No existing savings policies or programs directly address racial and 
ethnic disparities in the United States, although a few recent policies target low-income households 
(Nam, Ratcliffe, & McKernan, 2008; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 2001; Tufano & 
Schneider, 2010). 
Despite heightened awareness of the need for college savings and an increasing number of savings 
policies and programs, substantial proportions of families do not take advantage of economic 
incentives offered by CDAs and other tax-based approaches to saving for education. Rates of 
participation are especially low in savings programs that require individual action (e.g., opt-in 
programs, which oblige eligible individuals to open and to make deposits into an account). In 2001, 
only 3% of households with children held a 529 college savings plan or other education savings 
account with tax benefits (Dynarski, 2004). In a 2008 pilot for Maine’s Harold Alfond College 
Challenge program, the families of infants born in two Maine hospitals received hands-on outreach 
and enrollment assistance, but the enrollment rate was only 53%. When offered statewide in 2009–
2013, the program was unable to sustain intensive outreach efforts, and it enrolled about 40% of 
eligible children. Recognizing the limitations of requiring parents to opt into enrollment for their 
child, the College Challenge has worked with state officials to launch statewide automatic deposits in 
2014. Each newborn Maine resident newborn will receive a $500 postsecondary education grant, 
which will be deposited automatically into the College Challenge’s 529 college savings plan account 
(Clancy & Lassar, 2010; Clancy & Sherraden, 2014). Michigan SEED, a community-based CDA 
program, also employed active recruitment efforts through mail, phone calls, and in-person visits. 
Like the pilot in Maine, Michigan SEED required adults to opt in by opening an account for the 
child beneficiary, and 62% of the treatment group held such an account by the time of a follow-up 
survey conducted at the end of the 4-year program. On average, the accounts held $220 in savings at 
that point (excluding savings incentives from the program; Marks, Rhodes, Engelhardt, Scheffler, & 
Wallace, 2009). Findings from Michigan SEED also indicate that savings outcomes among members 
of racial minorities are worse than those among their White counterparts: Savings and total asset 
amounts (savings plus incentives from the program) are significantly lower for Blacks than for their 
White counterparts with comparable characteristics (Marks et al., 2009). 
The low account-holding rates and small savings amounts typical in opt-in savings programs are not 
limited to programs that focus on saving for children’s future. Evidence indicates that enrollment 
and contribution rates are also low in retirement savings programs, although such programs often 
match individual savings with contributions from employers: 30% of eligible workers do not 
participate in employment-based retirement savings programs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009); 20% 
to 72% surrender retirement benefits by contributing less than the match threshold in their 401(k) 
account (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2011). In an H&R Block experiment offering savings matches 
for contributions to individual retirement accounts, the highest take-up rate is 14% among the 
treatment group offered a 50% match rate (Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, & Saez, 2006). 
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Account-holding rates are higher in opt-out retirement programs than in ones that require 
participants to opt in. That is, the rate is higher if programs automatically open accounts for eligible 
individuals and allow them to close the accounts than if individuals must act to open their own 
accounts. The impacts of automatic account opening are especially large among Blacks, Hispanics, 
and members of disadvantaged groups (e.g., low-wage workers). However, savings amounts are 
estimated to be lower in opt-out programs than in opt-in ones (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; 
Madrian & Shea, 2001). In sum, considerable proportions of eligible individuals do not participate in 
savings programs if they are required to take purposeful action (opt-in programs), and a only small 
percentage save at the optimal point (i.e., an amount equal to the maximum eligible for a match). 
These findings challenge an assumption of neoclassical economic theory: that rational individuals 
make decisions and act in accordance with their calculation of costs and benefits; they are expected 
to take advantage of generous incentives in savings programs if the cost of doing so (e.g., opening an 
account) is smaller than the benefit (Beverly et al., 2008; Stone, 2012; Weintraub, 1993). If the 
assumption is problematic, what explains the low rates of participation in retirement and other 
savings programs? 
Procrastination is the most commonly mentioned theoretical reason for the low levels of 
responsiveness to savings incentives: Target populations delay action despite awareness of the 
potential benefits (Choi et al., 2004, 2011). Such research assumes, however, that eligible individuals 
are knowledgeable about savings programs. The research does not directly examine the possibility 
that lack of program knowledge contributes to inaction. Accordingly, we know little about the roles 
of eligible individuals’ program knowledge in savings outcomes. In addition, the procrastination 
framework does not explain why program participation rates are lower among racial and ethnic 
minority groups than among Whites. It is plausible that there are racial and ethnic disparities in 
program knowledge and that these gaps explain racial and ethnic disparities in savings outcomes. 
Using data from the SEED for Oklahoma Kids (SEED OK) experiment, we examine whether and 
how participants’ program knowledge affects eligible individuals’ chances of holding a participant-
owned account. In addition, we examine the relationship between such knowledge and individual 
savings amounts in CDAs. We also investigate racial and ethnic disparities: Does the level of 
program knowledge among eligible individuals differ by race and ethnicity? Do these differences 
explain racial and ethnic disparities in savings outcomes? 
This is the first empirical study that directly examines relationships between program knowledge and 
savings outcomes in CDAs. Most empirical studies have focused on retirement savings programs, 
such as 401(k)s and individual retirement accounts (Agnew, Szykman, Utkus, & Young, 2012; Choi 
et al., 2004, 2005, 2011). In addition, we use data collected with measures of actual program 
knowledge. Except for a small number of studies (e.g., Agnew et al., 2012), most research has 
employed proxy measures, such as indicators of general financial knowledge, financial education, 
and communication concerning retirement savings programs (Choi et al., 2005; Duflo & Saez, 2003). 
In addition, no study has investigated the role of program knowledge in racial and ethnic disparities 
in savings outcomes. 
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1. Research Review 
1.1. General financial knowledge and savings outcomes 
Previous research indicates that individuals’ general knowledge about financial issues is positively 
associated with savings outcomes in programs designed to facilitate the accumulation of assets. The 
chances of participating in savings programs and the amounts saved are greater among those with a 
high level of financial knowledge than among those with a low level of such knowledge (Choi et al., 
2011; Hastings, Madrian, & Skimmyhorn, 2013). However, causality is difficult to establish because 
of endogeneity. On one hand, financially knowledgeable individuals tend to make optimal financial 
decisions; they are likely to participate in such programs and accumulate savings. On the other hand, 
participation in savings programs may enhance individuals’ financial knowledge. Accordingly, studies 
based on cross-sectional observation data cannot determine whether financial knowledge promotes 
participation in savings programs or vice versa (Hastings et al., 2013). 
The study by Huang, Nam, and Sherraden (2013) is unique in that it uses experimental data. It also 
employs a financial knowledge variable created with SEED OK baseline data as well as account and 
savings records. Since SEED OK measured financial knowledge in the baseline survey, before the 
intervention began, the study by Huang and colleagues is well positioned to examine how financial 
knowledge influences eligible individuals’ participation in CDAs. It finds that financial knowledge 
has significant impacts only on the treatment group: Treatment participants with high levels of 
financial knowledge are more likely to hold a SEED OK account than are participants with low 
levels of such knowledge, but financial knowledge does not lead to significant differences in account 
holding among control-group members (Huang, Nam, et al., 2013). However, Huang, Nam, and 
Sherraden (2013) do not examine participants’ knowledge of program rules and economic incentives. 
1.2. Financial education and savings outcomes 
Most studies on financial education investigate effects on retirement savings (not on CDAs), are 
based on survey data, and find that education programs have positive impacts (Bernheim & Garrett, 
2003; Hastings et al., 2013; Nyce, 2005). However, these studies are subject to selection bias: Those 
likely to save (e.g., those with strong future orientation and those interested in building wealth) are 
prone to participate in financial education (Hastings et al., 2013). 
In contrast, experimental studies generate more reliable evaluations because randomization limits 
selection bias. However, previous experiments have generated mixed findings on the effectiveness 
of financial education. On one hand, some empirical studies suggest that increasing information 
through education and media coverage has little impact. In results from an experiment that assesses 
the effects of exposure to information about the potential monetary benefits of increasing 401(k) 
contributions, Choi and colleagues (2011) find that contribution increases by treatment-group 
members exposed to the information are not significantly greater than increases by counterparts in 
the control group. Another study by Choi and colleagues (2005) finds that employee investment in 
employer stocks declined by only 2 percentage points after extensive media coverage of Enron and 
the risks of 401(k) plans that invest solely in employers’ stocks. 
On the other hand, several experiments (or natural experiments) generate evidence on the 
effectiveness of financial education and information for certain groups of employees. Financial 
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education increases participation rates and amounts saved in two types of retirement plans: the 
federal Thrift Savings Plan for military personnel (Skimmyhorn, 2012) and 401(k)s for young 
workers (Clark, Morrill, & Allen, 2012). Financial education may affect those directly exposed to the 
treatment as well as colleagues exposed through peer influence. A randomized experiment finds that 
inviting treatment-group members to a benefits fair and giving them a $20 incentive to attend 
increases the likelihood that they will go to the fair; they are also more likely than control-group 
members to open a tax-deferred retirement account after attending. Interestingly, employees who 
work in the same department as a treatment-group member are more likely to attend the benefits 
fair and to enroll in the retirement savings program than are employees in departments that employ 
no treatment participant. These findings suggest the nature of the role played by social networks 
(Duflo & Saez, 2003). 
Overall, research is inconclusive concerning the effect of financial education on outcomes in savings 
programs. Findings suggest that future inquiry should investigate what types of financial education 
improve financial decisions and savings outcomes, not whether financial education is generally 
effective. It seems likely that the content and delivery structure of financial education programs 
determine their effectiveness in promoting savings (Hastings et al., 2013). 
1.3. Program knowledge and savings outcomes 
As we mention, few studies include direct measures of program knowledge. Analyzing data from 
account records and survey responses, Agnew and colleagues (2012) use three measures to examine 
the effects of program knowledge on savings outcomes in 401(k) retirement accounts. The measures 
capture whether one is aware of match availability, match rates, and loan availability. Their analyses 
clearly identify positive impacts of program knowledge: The likelihood of opting into a program and 
the chances of choosing not to opt out are both greater among those aware that the match is 
available than among those who are unaware of it. Knowledge of match rates is positively associated 
with participation in the opt-in plan. Awareness of loan availability, however, is not associated with 
401(k) plan participation (Agnew et al., 2012). Another study finds that knowledge of their 
employer’s 401(k) plan is higher among employees who contribute enough to be eligible for the 
employer’s match than among counterparts who do not contribute or among those who contribute 
less than the match threshold (Choi et al., 2011). 
2. SEED OK Intervention 
A social experiment testing a universal and progressive CDA policy, SEED OK is built on the 
structure of the tax-preferred Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan (OK 529), which is operated by 
the state of Oklahoma and offers several tax incentives for college savings. There is no federal or 
state tax on OK 529 investment earnings as long as the savings are used for qualified postsecondary 
education expenses. Also, contributions to OK 529 can be deducted from state income taxes (up to 
$10,000 a year for individuals and $20,000 for couples filing jointly). However, there is a penalty for 
nonqualified withdrawals: Account owners pay federal and state income taxes as well as an 
additional 10% penalty on investment earnings (not contributions) of distributions that are not for 
qualified higher education expenses. In order to open an OK 529 account, a typical individual must 
submit an enrollment form and make a $100 minimum initial contribution (Oklahoma 529 College 
Savings Plan, n.d.).  
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Table 1. Program Rules and Incentives: OK 529 and SEED OK 
Program features  OK 529 SEED OK intervention 
Eligibility   
Who is eligible? Adults aged 18 or older, including 
SEED OK control group 
SEED OK treatment group 
Participant-owned accounts   
Was information on the program 
provided directly to eligible 
individuals?  
Public information on program is 
available online and in various 
written formats  
Caregivers received mailed educational 
materials about OK 529, SEED OK 
intervention, and saving for college 
Children receive quarterly SEED OK 
account statements 
What must be done to open an 
account? 
Submit enrollment form 
Initial $100 deposit required 
Submit enrollment form 
No initial deposit required 
What incentives are available?  Tax benefits  Tax benefits same as those for OK 529 
$100 account-opening incentive 
Savings matches (if income eligible) 
What must be done to receive $100 
account-opening incentive?  
Incentive not available  Open participant-owned account by 
April 15, 2009 
What must be done to receive savings 
matches? 
Match not available Submit one-time match-eligibility form 
and make own deposits into 
participant-owned accounts  
State-owned accounts   
What must be done to have state-
owned account and $1,000 seed 
deposit?  
Features not available No action required (Study participants 
gave Social Security number of their 
children before the intervention 
started) 
Note: OK 529 = Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan; SEED OK = SEED for Oklahoma Kids. 
The SEED OK intervention focuses on a randomized sample of the primary caregivers (most of 
whom are mothers) of infants born in Oklahoma during 2007 (additional study details below). The 
intervention has offered no incentive or information to members of the control group but the 
following incentives to treatment participants, who also are eligible for the tax benefits described  
(Table 1). First, the Oklahoma treasurer’s office opened a state-owned OK 529 account on behalf of 
each infant whose caregiver is a member of the treatment group, and the office deposited a $1,000 
savings seed in each account. The state opened the accounts automatically and without requiring 
action by treatment participants, who could choose to decline the account and to opt out of SEED 
OK (one mother opted out for religious reasons). The state could open state-owned accounts in this 
way because study participants (treatment or control participants) provided their infant’s Social 
Security numbers while completing the baseline survey. Second, SEED OK encouraged treatment 
participants to open their own OK 529 account (i.e., a participant-owned account), which is separate 
from the one opened by the state. These accounts can be opened with an initial deposit of $100, and 
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SEED OK sought to eliminate a participation barrier by providing that initial sum for treatment 
members who opened a participant-owned account for their infant before April 15, 2009. Third, the 
intervention provided savings matches of up to $250 per year for the first 4 years of the program 
(2008–2011) if treatment participants made deposits into their own accounts and if their federal tax 
return listed an adjusted gross income below $43,999. The experiment required treatment 
participants to submit a one-time match-eligibility form in order to receive the matches. The form 
allowed  the Oklahoma Tax Commission to search participants’ tax records for 2008-2011 so that 
SEED OK could determine income eligibility for the savings match (Marks, Rhodes, & Scheffler, 
2008; Nam et al., 2013). 
As such, SEED OK required treatment participants to meet distinct requirements in order to access 
incentives. Since the treasurer’s office automatically opened and funded  each child beneficiary’s 
state-owned account, treatment participants did not need to take any action of their own to receive 
$1,000 seed deposit. However, SEED OK required treatment participants to meet distinct 
requirements in order to access other incentives. The experiment required treatment participants to 
open a participant-owned account (filling out and submitting an enrollment form) in order to receive 
the $100 account-opening incentive. In order to receive the matching deposits into the state-owned 
account for the child beneficiary, treatment participants were required to submit a form, meet a 
means-test, and save money into the their participant-owned account.. Accordingly, treatment 
participants’ knowledge of SEED OK program rules and incentives may influence whether they 
hold a participant-owned account and the amount they save there. 
The experiment gave treatment participants information to improve their program knowledge 
throughout SEED OK’s implementation. At the beginning of implementation, SEED OK mailed 
three documents to all treatment participants: a frequently-asked-questions brochure, a booklet 
entitled Let’s Get Started, and the terms of the savings match (SEED for Oklahoma Kids, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c). These materials contained both general information on OK 529 and specific 
information on the SEED OK intervention.1 Since the initial implementation stage, OK 529 has 
mailed quarterly SEED OK account statements to beneficiaries. In addition, SEED OK 
occasionally sends small gifts (e.g., T-shirts and storybooks) and information. These efforts 
encourage saving and emphasize the importance of children’s education and development. 
It should also be noted that SEED OK has disseminated information almost exclusively through 
mail. Because of SEED OK’s experimental nature, communication with participants is limited: The 
information should go only to treatment participants, not to families in the control group or to those 
not participating in the SEED OK experiment. A universal CDA policy implemented statewide or 
nationally would send frequent messages (e.g., via public service announcements on television, radio, 
and the Internet) and enlist multiple messengers (e.g., public officials, teachers, social workers, and 
businesses). These communications would supply information about the CDA program and 
encourage saving (Clancy & Sherraden, 2014; Gray, Clancy, Sherraden, Wagner, & Miller-Cribbs, 
2012; Nam et al., 2013). 
                                                 
1 Participants who indicated that Spanish is their primary language receive information in that language. 
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3.1. Data and sample 
Data for this study come from the SEED OK experiment. The experiment’s sample consists of the 
primary caregivers of infants who were randomly selected from the birth certificates of all infants 
born in Oklahoma during two 3-month periods in 2007 (April–June and August–October). The 
experiment employs a stratified random sampling method to oversample Blacks, American Indians, 
and Hispanics. This enables us to examine impacts on these subpopulations. 
Out of 7,328 infants selected from birth certificates, SEED OK excluded 213 ineligible cases (e.g., 
ineligible due to the death of the infant or mother). Among the remaining 7,115 cases, caregivers of 
2,704 infants agreed to participate in the experiment and completed the baseline survey via 
telephone interviews conducted from fall 2007 though spring 2008 (Marks et al., 2008; Nam et al., 
2013).2 After participants completed the baseline survey, SEED OK randomly assigned 1,358 of 
them to the treatment group and 1,346 of them to the control group, offering the described financial 
incentives only to treatment participants (Nam et al., 2013). In the spring of 2011, 2,251 of the 2,704 
study participants completed a follow-up survey (83% response rate; Schreiner, 2012). 
The SEED OK data come from several sources. First, birth certificate data provide demographic 
information on the infant, birth mother, and birth father. These data were collected at or shortly 
after the infant’s birth. Second, baseline and follow-up survey data come from telephone interviews 
with study participants. As we describe , the baseline survey took place before random assignment; 
the follow-up survey occurred about 4 years after implementation of the intervention. In addition to 
information on demographic, socioeconomic, and family characteristics, both sets of survey data 
contain study participants’ reports on their perceptions, knowledge, and behaviors. The follow-up 
survey collected information on treatment participants’ knowledge of SEED OK incentives and 
rules. Last, account and savings data come from the OK 529 manager, TIAA-CREF, and are 
available because of an agreement between the OK 529 board and the SEED OK research team. 
These data include detailed information on every OK 529 account that identifies a SEED OK child 
as the beneficiary. Information on accounts includes account balances as well as quarter-to-date, 
year-to-date, and life-to-date deposits and withdrawals. The data also indicate the account owner’s 
relationship to the beneficiary. Collected for the first 4 years of the SEED OK intervention, the data 
cover the period from January 1, 2008 (the date on which SEED OK notified participants of 
treatment status), through December 31, 2011 (the end of the savings match incentive). 
                                                 
2 The baseline participation rate (38%) is comparable to those for large-scale telephone surveys: 48% for the Survey of 
Consumer Attitudes in 2003 (Curtin, Presser, & Singer, 2005) and 25% for Pew Research Center’s national survey 
(Keeter, Kennedy, Dimock, Best, & Craighill, 2006). Study design in SEED OK may have impeded participation by 
requiring participants to provide their infant’s Social Security number, which is needed to open an OK 529 account; 
before SEED OK randomly assigned them to the treatment or control condition, participants had a 50% chance of 
receiving the $1,000 seed deposit into infants’ state-owned account, and SEED OK communicated this to them. That 
may have sounded too good to be true (Marks et al., 2008; Nam et al., 2013). Comparisons show that study participants 
do not differ significantly from nonparticipants on most of the characteristics indicated in birth certificate data. 
Specifically, the two groups do not differ on infant’s race, ethnicity, gender, and birth weight or on mother’s marital 
status and location of residency (Nam et al., 2013). 
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Our analyses for this study exclude control-group participants (1,346 of the 2,704 study participants) 
because SEED OK incentives are not offered to them; their knowledge of SEED OK program 
features would not affect their savings outcomes. We also omit 214 of the 1,358 treatment 
participants because they did not complete the follow-up survey, which posed questions on SEED 
OK program knowledge. We exclude five additional cases because the caregivers interviewed for the 
follow-up were not the same persons identified as primary caregivers in the baseline survey. The 
final analytical sample consists of 1,139 adults. All but eight are mothers of SEED OK children: 
Two are fathers, four are grandmothers or great grandmothers, one is an aunt, and one is a legal 
guardian. For simplicity, we often refer to participants as mothers. 
3.2. Measures 
This study has two dependent variables: account-holding status and individual savings amount. We 
create them with account and savings data on SEED OK participant-owned accounts. Account-
holding status is a dichotomous variable (assigned a value of 1 if a study  participant  held a 
participant-owned account for a SEED OK child as of December 31, 2011, and 0 otherwise). 
Individual savings amount indicates the amount deposited by a study participant into her or his 
participant-owned account during the observation period (January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2011). 
The individual savings amount does not include the value of SEED OK incentives, such as the 
$1,000 seed deposit, the $100 account-opening incentive, and savings matches. For regression 
analyses, we use a logarithm of individual savings. Some participants had no savings in their 
participant-owned account. To retain these cases for regression analyses, we assign a value of 1 to 
the individual savings variable for each of those cases before we convert savings figures into 
logarithmic forms. 
The main independent variables measure treatment participants’ SEED OK program knowledge. 
We create these variables from responses to three questions posed in the follow-up survey. The 
questions ask whether a treatment participant knows that (a) she could open her own OK 529 
account without depositing her own money, (b) she could receive a $100 account-opening incentive, 
and (c) she may have been eligible for a savings match. We create two sets of variables. For the first 
set, we generate three dichotomous variables, assigning a value of 1 for each affirmative response to 
a question and 0 otherwise. For the second set, we generate a summary variable by counting the 
program features known to the treatment participant. Values for this variable range from 0 to 3. 
The variables for race and ethnicity are created from birth certificate data that follow the vital 
statistics protocol of the National Center for Health Statistics (Marks et al., 2008). We assign 
children to the racial or ethnic category that the birth certificate lists for their mother: White, Black, 
American Indian, and Hispanic (Marks et al., 2008; Mason, Nam, & Kim 2014). We categorize 26 
Asian cases (e.g., Chinese or Japanese) as White, because the number of Asians is too small for 
separate analyses. We run supplemental analyses after excluding these Asians to test the robustness 
of our findings. 
In addition, we generate several variables that capture the characteristics of the child, caregiver, 
household, and environment. We use birth certificate data to generate the variable for the child’s 
gender (male or female) and baseline survey data to create the variables for caregiver’s characteristics. 
Measured characteristics of the caregiver include age (categorized as 24 or younger, 25–34, and 35 or 
older), education (less than a high school degree, high school or general equivalency diploma, some 
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college, and bachelor’s degree or higher), marital status (married or not), and nativity status (U.S. 
native or foreign born). 
The variables for household characteristics are also generated from baseline data. Household size is 
measured with three categories (two or three members, four members, and five or more members), 
and the number of children is measured with four (one child, two children, three or more children, 
and a missing value). Household income is a continuous measure that captures total income before 
taxes and deductions for the 12 months prior to the baseline. To prevent a sizeable number of cases 
(n = 49) from dropping out of the analyses, we create an indicator for missing income, assigning a 
value of 0 to the income variable for those cases. The homeownership variable is dichotomous (1 = 
homeowners; 0 = nonowners). To create the variable for financial asset ownership, we assign a value of 1 
to households that own one or more types of the following assets: CDs, treasury bills, or corporate 
bonds; savings bonds; retirement accounts; other stocks or mutual funds; savings at home or with a 
trusted friend or family member; and other types of savings. We assign a value of 0 to all other 
households. We use three categories to capture the primary language spoken at home: English, 
Spanish, and other languages. We create an indicator to measure Internet service at home (1 = yes; 0 
= no). 
Finally, this study includes a survey-related variable: survey recruitment stage. The variable takes a 
value of 0 if SEED OK recruited the treatment participant between August and December of 2007 
(Stage 1) and a value of 1 otherwise (Stage 2). 
3.3. Statistical approach 
We employ logit regressions for the dichotomous dependent variable of account-holding status and 
Tobit regressions for the continuous dependent variable of individual savings amount. We use Tobit 
regressions instead of ordinary least squares regressions because 83% of participants have no savings. 
Tobit regression is a statistical method for censored dependent variables (Greene, 2003). In our 
study, individual savings amount is censored at zero. As we describe, the distribution of individual 
savings is skewed, so we use the log of individual savings. 
We run two models to test whether and how study participants’ SEED OK program knowledge 
affects their savings outcomes and to assess whether racial and ethnic gaps in program knowledge 
explain racial and ethnic disparities in savings outcomes: The first is a simple model that does not 
include the program knowledge variables, and the second is a comprehensive model that includes 
them. The simple model is expressed as follows: 
Yi = β0s + β1s*Ri + β2s*Xi + εis,  (1) 
where Yi indicates the dependent variable (log-odds of holding a participant-owned account or log 
savings amount) for treatment participant i, Ri denotes a vector of the dummy variables for the race 
and ethnicity of SEED OK child i, Xi is a vector of control variables, and εi indicates a random error. 
The second (i.e., comprehensive) model, which includes program knowledge variables as well as the 
variables from the simple model, can be expressed as follows: 
Yi = β0c + β1c*Ri + β2c*Xi + β3c*Ki +εic.  (2) 
PROGRAM KNOWLEDGE AND SAVINGS OUTCOMES IN A CHILD DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT EXPERIMENT 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
13 
In this model, Ki denotes the program knowledge of participant i. 
The coefficients of program knowledge variables (β3c) indicate whether a treatment participant’s 
knowledge of SEED OK affects savings outcomes. Significantly positive coefficients suggest that 
the savings outcome of interest (account holding or individual savings amount) is higher among 
those who are more knowledgeable about SEED OK. 
To assess roles of program knowledge in racial disparities in savings outcomes, we compare the 
simple model’s coefficients for race and ethnicity with those from the comprehensive model. If 
racial and ethnic differences in program knowledge result in lower account-holding rates and 
individual savings among minority groups, the coefficients from the comprehensive model’s race 
and ethnicity dummy variables should be significantly smaller than those from the simple model (β1c 
< β1s). We run adjusted Wald tests to determine whether the coefficient sizes between the two 
models are significantly different from each other. 
In every analysis, we use weighted data to adjust for nonresponse, attrition, and the oversampling of 
minority groups (Marks et al., 2008; Schreiner, 2012). Weighting is a commonly used postsurvey 
adjustment (Groves, 2006). 
We also run supplemental analyses to check the robustness of our findings. Three sets of analyses 
test robustness with slightly different compositions of the analytical sample. The first composition 
only includes mothers of SEED OK children (i.e., excludes caregivers, such as grandparents, who 
are not mothers). The second only includes Oklahoma residents and excludes caregivers who moved 
out of Oklahoma after the SEED OK child’s birth. The third set excludes Asians, so that the White 
category only includes Whites. In addition, we run one set of regressions with a different household 
income variable: the log average income of the baseline and follow-up surveys (the main model 
instead uses a baseline income variable). With a few exceptions, results from the supplementary 
analyses are substantively identical to those described in this paper. The Results section below 
discusses supplemental results that differ from those in the main model. (Full results from 
supplementary analyses are available from authors.) 
4. Results 
4.1.  Sample characteristics by race and ethnicity 
Table 2 reports the characteristics of children, mothers, and households by race and ethnicity. As we 
expected, Whites have socioeconomic advantages over their minority counterparts: Among White 
mothers, rates of marriage, postsecondary degree completion, homeownership, ownership of 
financial assets, and home access to the Internet are all higher, as is household income. Among the 
three minority groups, American Indians fare best on measured economic indicators: Their average 
household income, rate of homeownership, and rate of asset ownership are higher. 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity 
Characteristic Whites Blacks American 
Indians 
Hispanics Total 
Child’s characteristics      
Male (%) 46.52 49.80 41.37 48.53 46.49 
Mother’s characteristics      
Age (%)+      
24 or younger 40.34 49.91 51.60 45.90 43.20 
25–34 51.40 42.14 40.87 45.77 48.63 
35 or older 8.27 7.95 7.53 8.33 8.16 
Education (%)**      
Less than high school diploma 14.54 21.47 26.83 48.32 20.97 
High school diploma  31.40 39.12 35.45 31.69 32.59 
Some college 27.10 27.58 26.43 12.99 25.23 
Bachelor’s degree or more 26.95 11.83 11.28 7.00 21.21 
Married (%)** 69.40 23.75 56.94 57.44 63.32 
Native born (%)** 97.46 95.82 99.62 45.01 90.71 
Household characteristics      
Household size (%)**      
2–3 people 31.44 45.38 29.18 21.96 31.19 
4 people 35.42 30.67 30.95 33.50 34.23 
5 or more people 33.15 23.96 39.88 44.53 34.57 
No. of children (%)**      
1 32.35 31.66 35.44 22.70 31.38 
2 37.44 35.83 28.60 33.92 35.83 
3 or more 29.03 30.73 34.62 39.17 31.14 
Missing 1.19 1.77 1.34 4.22 1.65 
Household income (mean, dollars)** 50,746 21,638 31,982 21,281 42,346 
Household income missing (%)** 3.53 3.80 3.22 10.25 4.40 
Homeownership (%)** 51.50 18.37 35.18 28.63 43.69 
Financial asset ownership (%)** 61.20 45.07 46.62 32.73 54.38 
Internet service at home (%)** 71.04 40.38 42.89 32.99 60.12 
Language at home (%)**      
English 98.87 98.08 98.53 41.16 91.23 
Spanish 1.13 1.28 1.47 45.56 6.98 
Other 0.00 0.64 0.00 13.28 1.79 
Recruited at Stage 2 (%) 52.25 53.93 43.89 49.34 51.07 
Weighted percentage (%) 49.08 16.59 18.79 15.54 100.00 
Unweighted sample size 559 189 214 177 1,139 
Note: M = mean. In statistical tests of group differences, we use Pearson’s χ2 for categorical variables and adjusted Wald 
tests for continuous variables. 
+ p < .10.  
* p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
4.2. Racial and ethnic differences in program knowledge and savings outcomes 
Table 3 presents program knowledge and savings outcomes by race and ethnicity. As the last column 
of Table 3 shows, study participants demonstrate a less than full awareness of SEED OK features. 
Only 49% report that they are aware of the $100 account-opening incentive. Smaller percentages are 
aware that they can open an OK 529 participant-owned account without making a deposit (40%) 
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and that savings matches are available for those who are eligible (35%). On average, participants 
understand 1.24 program features. 
Table 3 also shows disparities in program knowledge. Overall, knowledge of SEED OK program 
features is highest among Whites: 47% know that no deposit is required, 53% are aware of the $100 
account-opening incentive, and 39% know about match availability. These results are 5 to 15 
percentage points higher than those for American Indians, the group with the next-highest levels of 
knowledge. Results from the summary knowledge variable also show low levels of program 
knowledge among treatment participants, especially among the minority participants. Almost 40% of 
Whites lack awareness of any of the three program features, and rates are similar or higher for most 
minorities. Although Whites are the most knowledgeable group, less than one third are aware of all 
three program features; 19% of Blacks, 22% of American Indians, and 11% of Hispanics are aware 
of all three. Thus, average awareness of program features is also low: 1.39 features among Whites, 
1.09 among American Indians, 0.93 among Blacks, and 0.79 among Hispanics. 
In addition, the table reports on savings outcomes. The last column shows that 17% of the sample 
opened a participant-owned OK 529 account during the first 4 years of the SEED OK intervention, 
and the average savings is $125. Savings outcomes differ by race and ethnicity. The best savings 
outcomes are found among Whites, who have the highest account-holding rate (21%) and average 
savings amount (about $170). 
Table 3. Program Knowledge and Savings Outcome by Race and Hispanic Origin 
Characteristic Whites Blacks American 
Indians 
Hispanics Total 
Awareness of SEED OK incentives      
Aware that no deposit required (%)** 46.52 29.13 31.91 20.14 39.85 
Aware of $100 account-opening incentive (%)** 53.11 37.39 43.14 38.57 48.67 
Aware of availability of match (%)** 39.14 26.27 33.85 20.74 34.98 
Summary: awareness of program features (%)**      
0 feature 39.09 56.69 50.42 57.86 44.41 
1 feature 12.48 12.48 12.22 16.20 12.94 
2 features 19.01 12.18 15.40 14.55 17.40 
3 features 29.42 18.65 21.96 11.39 25.25 
Summary: awareness of program features (mean)** 1.39 0.93 1.09 0.79 1.24 
Savings outcomes      
Accounting holding (%)** 21.29 11.47 9.44 5.94 17.06 
Savings amount (mean, dollars)** 169 15 79 16 125 
Unweighted sample size 559 189 214 177 1,139 
Note: In statistical tests of group differences, we use Pearson’s χ2 for categorical variables and adjusted Wald tests for 
continuous variables. 
+ p < .10. 
* p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
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Table 4. Level of Awareness and Savings Outcomes 
Element Account holding 
(%) 
Savings amount  
(mean in dollars) 
Aware that no deposit required   
No 10.73** 120 
Yes 26.62 132 
Aware of $100 account-opening incentive   
No 5.09 ** 69* 
Yes 29.69 184 
Aware of availability of match   
No 7.01** 60** 
Yes 35.74 246 
Summary of awareness: no. of program features   
0–1 6.01** 63* 
2–3 31.91 208 
+ p < .10. 
* p < .05. 
** p < .01 
 
4.3. Program knowledge and savings outcomes 
Table 4 shows that savings outcomes are better among treatment participants who are 
knowledgeable about SEED OK features. The account-holding rate is 11% among those unaware 
that no deposit was required to open a participant-owned account and 27% among those aware of 
this program rule. The difference in account-holding rates between the two groups is statistically 
significant. On average, the two groups save $120 and $132, respectively, but the difference is not 
significant. Differences are more salient in the results on awareness of the $100 account-opening 
incentive and of match availability. The rate of account holding and average savings amount are 
higher among those aware of the account-opening incentive than those unaware of it, and the gaps 
are statistically significant. The same is true of the difference between those who have and lack 
awareness of the savings match. The summary variable generates similar results: The account-
holding rate and average savings amount are significantly higher among those aware of two or three 
SEED OK features than among those aware of none or one of the features; there is a 26-
percentage-point gap in account holding and a $145 difference in average savings. 
4.4. Regression analysis results: SEED OK program knowledge and savings outcomes 
Table 5 presents results from the regressions. The first three columns report results from three 
models of account holding, and the last three show results from models on savings amounts. Across 
these models, the results for most control variables are in the expected direction: Caregivers’ age and 
education are positively associated with savings outcomes, as is access to Internet services at home. 
However, results for the primary language variable are somewhat unexpected: Compared with their 
English-speaking counterparts, those who speak Spanish or another non-English language at home 
are estimated to have a higher chance of holding a participant-owned account and save a larger 
amount. 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis Results: Account Holding and Savings Amount 
 Account holding  Log saving amount 
Characteristic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Child’s characteristics        
Race        
Black -.418 -.172 -.189  -3.426 -2.223 -2.464 
 (.336) (.348) (.344)  (2.112) (2.153) (2.162) 
American Indian -.519+ -.527+ -.460  -1.39 -1.340 -.940 
(.294) (.312) (.311)  (1.702) (1.548) (1.683) 
Hispanic -1.378* -1.082 -1.100  -5.968+ -4.372 -4.794 
 (.701) (.727) (.708)  (3.484) (3.095) (3.232) 
Male -.305 -.359+ -.352+  -.891 -.925 -.789 
 (.195) (.199) (.200)  (1.124) (1.036) (1.08) 
Caregiver’s characteristics        
Age        
25–34 .137 .157 .188  1.730 1.857 2.015 
 (.262) (.265) (.267)  (1.641) (1.469) (1.564) 
35 or older 1.038** .962** 1.063**  6.459** 4.896** 6.370** 
 (.350) (.366) (.371)  (2.124) (1.878) (2.032) 
Education        
High school diploma  .482 .425 .449  5.510+ 5.235+ 4.976+ 
(.443) (.467) (.456)  (2.885) (3.177) (2.986) 
Some college 1.090* .893+ .930+  7.445** 6.108+ 6.226* 
(.464) (.503) (.488)  (2.836) (3.172) (2.956) 
Bachelor’s degree or more 2.018** 1.556** 1.613**  13.277** 10.691** 10.995** 
(.514) (.559) (.541)  (2.963) (3.308) (3.077) 
Married .260 .314 .346  .633 .919 .882 
(.273) (.282) (.277)  (1.732) (1.597) (1.671) 
Native born  .800 .808 .808  -1.266 -.604 -.703 
 (.533) (.589) (.533)  (2.961) (2.813) (2.883) 
Household characteristics        
Household size        
4 people -.551 -.543 -.529  -4.449* -3.783+ -3.938+ 
(.407) (.440) (.414)  (2.179) (2.081) (2.020) 
5 or more people -.998 -.963 -.876  -1.724 -1.268 -.985 
(.613) (.645) (.624)  (3.128) (2.985) (2.862) 
No. of children        
2 children .666+ .715+ .750+  2.789 2.467 2.604 
(.395) (.425) (.402)  (2.154) (2.083) (2.017) 
3 or more children 1.015 .823 .800  -2.017 -3.144 -3.144 
(.623) (.650) (.632)  (3.247) (3.067) (2.995) 
Missing .143 -.139 -.024  2.050 .627 .822 
(1.296) (1.380) (1.252)  (5.574) (5.966) (5.512) 
Household income .007 -.002 -.017  -.078 .003 -.069 
(.105) (.112) (.114)  (.612) (.560) (.579) 
Household income, missing -1.377 -1.514 -1.617  -7.504 6.517 -7.442 
(1.352) (1.472) (1.466)  (7.701) (7.343) (7.430) 
Owns home -.021 .076 -.009  .405 .943 .481 
(.251) (.262) (.256)  (1.542) (1.463) (1.472) 
Owns liquid assets .376 .312 .316  1.096 .701 1.000 
(.242) (.253) (.247)  (1.493) (1.394) (1.411) 
Internet service at home .303 .307 .257  5.850** 6.131** 5.546** 
(.269) (.290) (.278)  (1.862) (1.769) (1.780) 
Primary language at home        
Spanish 1.976* 2.057* 2.108*  9.241* 9.673** 9.894** 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis Results: Account Holding and Savings Amount 
 Account holding  Log saving amount 
Characteristic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(.803) (.883) (.821)  (3.781) (3.635) (3.674) 
Other 1.906+ 1.854* 1.816*  10.328* 10.707** 9.900* 
 (.974) (.941) (.905)  (4.726) (3.796) (4.180) 
Recruited at Stage 2 .446* .345 .314  -.287 -.763 -1.069 
 (.202) (.217) (.214)  (1.094) (1.036) (1.082) 
Awareness of SEED OK        
No deposit required   -.184    -3.946*  
  (.243)    (1.221)  
$100 account-opening incentive  1.068**    3.071  
 (.350)    -1.972  
Availability of match  1.000**    6.909**  
 (.309)**    (1.841)  
Summary: level of awareness   .650**    2.324** 
  (.086)    (.439) 
Constant -4.339** -5.138** -4.991**  -23.948** -27.049** -26.745** 
 (1.183) (1.285) (1.274)  (6.949) (6.819) (6.916) 
Observations 1,139 1,139 1,139  1,139 1,139 1,139 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
+ p < .10. 
* p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
Results in the bottom panel of Table 5 tie participants’ awareness of SEED OK program features to 
their savings outcomes. Results concerning the account-opening incentive and savings match are as 
expected: Awareness of these incentives is significantly associated with the likelihood of holding a 
participant-owned account; savings amounts are higher among those aware of the features, but the 
difference is statistically significant only for match availability. Some unexpected results emerge from 
analyses of the awareness that no deposit was required to open a participant-owned account: 
Compared with counterparts who are unaware of this feature, participants who are aware of it are 
less likely to hold a participant-owned account (though the difference is not statistically significant) 
and save a significantly smaller amount into the account. These results are contrary to those 
produced by bivariate analyses (see Table 4). The differences between the two sets of results 
(bivariate and regression) may stem from strong correlations between this and other program 
knowledge variables. Among participants who are aware that a deposit was not required, 83% report 
awareness of the $100 account-opening incentive and 63% report awareness of match availability. 
Results from regression analyses with the summary variable (Model 3) clearly show the roles of 
SEED OK program knowledge in savings outcomes. Participants with better program knowledge 
are significantly more likely to hold participant-owned accounts and save significantly larger amounts 
into those accounts. 
4.5. Regression results: SEED OK program knowledge and racial and ethnic disparities in 
savings outcomes 
As we describe in the Methods section, each of the three models (the simple model and two 
comprehensive ones) produces coefficients from the dummy variables for race and ethnicity. We 
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compare those coefficients to examine whether differences in SEED OK program knowledge 
explain disparities in savings outcomes between Whites and minority groups. As Table 5 shows, the 
three race and ethnicity variables produce negative coefficients in all analyses. This suggests that 
Whites have better savings outcomes than the three minority groups do. 
Comparisons across the three models show that the Model 2 and Model 3 coefficients for account 
holding among Blacks are less than half the size of the corresponding Model 1 coefficient. The 
differences between Model-1 and Model-2 coefficients are significant at the .05 level (F[1, 1,138] = 
4.63; prob > F = 0.023), as are those between Model-1 and Model-3 coefficients (F[1, 1,138] = 4.95; 
prob > F = 0.026). In contrast, the coefficients for American Indians differ slightly across the 
simple and comprehensive models. The sizes of the coefficients for Hispanics decrease significantly 
between Models 1 and 2 (F [1, 1,138] = 3.38; prob > F = 0.066) as well as between Models 1 and 3 
(F [1, 1,138] = 3.63; prob > F = 0.057). Both sets of differences are significant at the .10 level. 
To illustrate the influence of program knowledge, we have constructed figure 1, which presents rates 
of account holding by race, ethnicity, and program knowledge. Figure 1 presents predicted account-
holding rates by race, ethnicity, and knowledge of SEED OK program features. We calculate the 
predicted probabilities using the logit regression (results reported in Table 5 for Model 3) and the 
following assumptions: The child is male; his mother is aged 25 to 34, married, and native born, with 
a high school diploma; his household consists of four people (two children) and has an annual 
income of $42,000; his household owns financial assets but not the home in which members reside; 
the household has Internet service at home, and its members speak only English; SEED OK 
recruited his caregiver at Stage 2. 
As the figure clearly shows, the influence of program knowledge is evident across racial and ethnic 
groups: If other characteristics are taken into account, the predicted account-holding rates are higher 
among more knowledgeable participants. In general, differences in account holding by levels of 
program knowledge are larger among Whites than among minorities: The difference between the 
most and the least knowledgeable groups is 27 percentage points (34% versus 7%) among Whites, 
24 percentage points among Blacks, 20 percentage points among American Indians, and 12 
percentage points among Hispanics. 
Figure 1 also demonstrates that disparities in program knowledge contribute to racial and ethnic 
disparities in account-holding status. Among those lacking knowledge of any of the three features 
(the largest group in each of the four racial and ethnic categories), the difference in predicted 
probabilities is 1 percentage point between Whites and Blacks, 2 percentage points between Whites 
and American Indians, and 4 percentage points between Whites and Hispanics. These estimates are 
much lower than the account-holding differences reported in Table 3: 10 percentage points, 12 
percentage points, and 15 percentage points, respectively. Although White–minority disparities in 
predicted account-holding rates increase as program knowledge improves, they are narrower than 
actual differences observed in the data. One exception is the 19-percentage-point gap in account-
holding rates between Whites with knowledge of all three features and Hispanics with the same. 
That gap in Figure 1 is 4 percentage points higher than the observed difference. The observation 
that differences between racial and ethnic groups are higher among more knowledgeable participants 
suggests that minorities may face unobserved barriers to SEED OK program participation even if 
they acquire the same level of program knowledge held by Whites with comparable characteristics. 
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Figure 1. Predicted OK 529 account holding rates by race, ethnicity, and program knowledge. 
Note: These calculations assume that the child is male, the mother is aged 23–34, married, and native 
born, with a high school diploma; the household consists of four people (two children), has annual 
income of $42,000, owns financial assets but not the home in which members reside, and has 
Internet access at home; household members speak only English, and SEED OK recruited the 
primary caregiver at Stage 2. 
Results on savings amounts also show the importance of program knowledge in racial disparities. 
The size of the coefficient for savings among Black participants changes from ˗ 3.426 in Model 1 to 
˗ 2.223 in Model 2, but the difference is not statistically significant at the .10 level (F[1, 1138) = 2.67; 
prob > F = .103). Table 5 also shows that the coefficient in Model 3 (˗ 2.464) is statistically 
significant (F[1, 1,138] = 4.09; prob > F = 0.043). That is to say, if participants’ program knowledge 
is not taken into account, the savings amount among Blacks is only 3.25% (exponential of ˗ 3.426) 
of that among Whites with comparable characteristics. The ratio of the savings among Blacks to that 
among Whites increases to 10.83% (exponential of ˗ 2.223) in Model 2 and 8.51% (exponential of 
˗ 2.464) in Model 3, suggesting that differences in individual savings amounts would decline if 
Blacks and Whites had comparable knowledge of SEED OK program features. The size of the 
coefficient for savings among American Indians changes little between Models 1 and 2, but the 
difference between Models 1 and 3 is not negligible. Although the difference between the size of the 
Model-1 and Model-3 coefficients is not statistically significant (F[1, 1138] =1.48; prob > F=0.22), 
the size of the Model-3 coefficient is only two thirds that of the coefficient for Model 1. Results for 
Hispanics are similar to those for Blacks: The size of the coefficient for savings among Hispanics 
changes between Models 1 and 2, but the change is not significant (p = .12); the change between 
Models 1 and 3 is significant at the .10 level. 
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This study examines the influences of program knowledge on savings outcomes in a CDA program 
and investigates whether differences in program knowledge explain racial disparities in those 
outcomes. Results from these analyses of data collected for the SEED OK experiment show that 
many treatment participants are not knowledgeable about SEED OK incentives and rules but that 
knowledge of SEED OK is positively associated with both measured savings outcomes: holding a 
participant-owned account and the amount of individual savings. These findings are consistent with 
previous research on retirement savings programs. Such research finds that those who are more 
knowledgeable about program incentives and rules are more likely to take advantage of economic 
incentives in savings programs by opening accounts and by making contributions up to the match 
thresholds (Agnew et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2011). This study also shows that lower levels of program 
knowledge among racial and ethnic minority groups explain lower rates of account holding and 
smaller savings amounts in these groups. 
Findings in this study are also consistent with the results of an analysis of SEED OK data from in-
depth interviews. That qualitative study suggests that SEED OK incentives may improve savings 
outcomes if treatment participants are aware of and understand SEED OK features. However, in-
depth interviews show that not every treatment participant is aware of SEED OK incentives or 
understands the SEED OK program rules. Some of those who did not open participant-owned 
accounts report that they did not receive or “really did not read” the program information mailed to 
them by SEED OK (Gray et al., 2012, p. 67). Other interviewees mistakenly think that a $100 initial 
deposit was required to open a participant-owned account or that regular contributions are required 
(Gray et al., 2012). 
The finding that program knowledge is important for program outcomes calls into question the 
validity of two assumptions in neoclassical economics: that rational individuals base decisions and 
actions on cost–benefit calculations and that rational individuals have full information on all 
available options. Accordingly, those assumptions lead proponents to expect that individuals will 
participate in and save into savings programs when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs 
(Beverly et al., 2008; Stone, 2012). Our findings suggest that this is not always the case: Members of 
target populations may not be aware of program incentives and thus may be prevented from taking 
advantage of the incentives. Even if the program provides information, some participants may not 
receive it (due to delivery problems), others may not read the delivered information, and still others 
may read but misunderstand what is sent. This study and other empirical research (Agnew et al., 
2012; Gray et al., 2012) indicate that program knowledge is a critical element to be considered in 
designing public policy. 
Our study also shows that levels of program knowledge are lower among racial and ethnic minority 
groups than among Whites. The finding raises the possibility that such differences may generate 
disparities in savings outcomes. Because this is the first empirical study to consider race and 
ethnicity in examining the relationship between program knowledge and savings outcomes, we 
cannot directly compare our findings with results from other studies. However, the current findings 
are consistent with evidence accumulated in the literature. In general, members of racial and ethnic 
minority groups have poorer financial knowledge than do Whites (Perry & Morris, 2005; Zhan, 
Anderson, & Scott, 2006). Financial knowledge is closely correlated with prudent financial decisions 
and savings outcomes (Howlett, Kees, & Kemp, 2008; Huang, Nam et al., 2013). 
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This study is not free from limitations. First, the sample consists of caregivers of children born in 
Oklahoma. Accordingly, this sample is not representative populations in other states or of the U.S. 
population as a whole. We recommend caution in generalizing these findings. Second, the 38% 
participation rate in SEED OK is relatively low and may raise questions about the study’s external 
validity; however, empirical evidence indicates that low participation rates do not automatically result 
in biased samples (Groves, 2006). We cannot rule out the possibility that study participants differ 
from nonparticipants in terms of propensity to save and other unobserved characteristics. Third, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity. This study assumes that participants’ program 
knowledge affects their savings outcomes. However, it is possible that holding the participant-
owned account may improve the account owner’s program knowledge. Fourth, the structure of the 
SEED OK experiment is more complex than would be any fully adopted public policy. Therefore, 
our findings may differ from the outcomes of fully adopted and implemented public policies. For 
example, SEED OK rules differ from (and conflict with) the rules of OK 529 (e.g., whether 
participants should make $100 initial deposits to open an account). In addition, SEED OK has a 
multiple-account structure (e.g., participant-owned and state-owned accounts) instead of one that 
combines individual college savings with public and other incentives. Although necessary for the 
experiment, the complicated program design may have confused some treatment participants. 
Furthermore, the experimental nature of SEED OK prevents the widespread use of 
communications tools (e.g., media campaigns and promotion by community leaders) available for 
fully adopted public policies. That is, use of those tools might compromise the experiment’s validity 
by exposing control participants to treatment components. If universal and progressive CDAs were 
adopted as state or federal policy, eligible individuals would likely have an easier time understanding 
the incentives and rules. 
Findings from this study have several implications for future research. First, the findings suggest a 
need for further investigation of the effect of program knowledge. Although this study expands our 
understanding of the roles of program knowledge in improving savings outcomes, we know very 
little about other policy outcomes. As we indicate, the policy goal of universal and progressive 
CDAs is to promote lifelong development by encouraging saving and asset accumulation. That is to 
say, individual saving outcomes should not be the only criterion used to evaluate CDAs. Progress 
toward other policy goals should be considered. For example, it seems relevant to assess whether 
CDAs improve financial management skills, parents’ hope for children’s future, parenting practices, 
children’s developmental outcomes, and children’s educational attainment. Other research 
documents SEED OK’s positive impacts on social-emotional development among disadvantaged 
young children (Huang, Sherraden, Kim, & Clancy, 2014) and the intervention’s role in reducing 
maternal depressive symptoms (Huang, Sherraden, & Purnell, 2014). Future research into the 
impacts of program knowledge on various outcomes may facilitate our understanding of how CDAs 
affect the target population. If program knowledge and individual saving performance are not 
associated with other outcomes, and if simply having a CDA (e.g., having an automatically opened 
state-owned account) generates positive impacts, future CDA policy should focus on program 
designs that will expand account ownership (e.g., plans requiring participants to opt out instead of 
ones requiring them to opt in). However, if program knowledge is associated with various outcome 
measures as well as individual savings, it will be necessary to develop additional communications 
tools. 
Second, we need further understanding of intersections between program knowledge and racial 
disparity. Specifically, we lack answers to several key questions. First, why are levels of program 
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knowledge lower among members of racial and ethnic minorities than among Whites? Second, does 
the effectiveness of communication tools and mechanisms differ by the race or ethnicity of the 
target population? Third, how does program knowledge (or lack thereof) contribute to racial 
disparities in savings outcomes? 
Our findings also have implications for public policy development. First, findings concerning the 
roles of program knowledge in savings outcomes justify our attention to policy design as a way to 
promote potential beneficiaries’ understanding of incentives and rules. Although increasing 
individual savings is not the only goal of CDAs, saving for children’s future may benefit children and 
the family. Savings and assets have strong associations with children’s educational attainment and 
other developmental outcomes (Conley, 2001; Lerman & McKernan, 2008; Nam & Huang, 2009). 
As we show, economic incentives alone may not promote savings if eligible individuals are unaware 
of the incentives or associated requirements. Policymakers and program developers should simplify 
program features to improve program knowledge among the target population, especially groups 
with low levels of financial knowledge. We also recommend incorporating effective communications 
in policy designs and implementation plans. 
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